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1 Introduction
Economists agree in that implicit contracts play an important role in real-
world economic life. As explicit contracts are mostly incomplete, implicit
agreements are oftentimes used to ll the resulting gaps. Examples are ubiq-
uitous: Baker et al. (1994) report on rms tying their employees remu-
nerations to subjective evaluations that are not veriable by third parties
(e.g. a court).1 Similarly, Holmström & Roberts (1998) describe the pat-
tern of relations between Japanese manufacturing rms and their suppliers.
This pattern is characterized by long-term, close relations that substitute for
ownership in protecting specic assets.
Driven by the wish to understand implicit contracts and their properties,
economists have tried to incorporate these contracts into their models.2 At
the core of these models lies the notion of trust. As implicit contracts are
not enforceable by a court, the parties have to trust each other that the
contract will not be reneged on. Trust is usually modeled by considering an
innitely repeated game, in which unworthy behavior of a party is punished
by the other parties in form of an ultimate switch to the stage-game Nash-
equilibrium strategy. As I discuss in a companion paper (Gürtler (2005)), this
modeling approach is - besides its technical limitations - problematic since
1See also Gibbons (2005).
2There are many examples: Bull (1987) considers implicit contracts in a labor-market
context. Baker et al. (1994), Schmidt & Schnitzer (1995) and Pearce & Stacchetti (1998)
analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts. Finally, Garvey (1995), Baker et
al. (2002) and Halonen (2002) introduce implicit contracts into the property rights theory
of the rm.
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it cannot account for many real-world behavioral patterns. For instance, it
cannot capture any evolution of trust. On the equilibrium path, all parties
either always trust each other or they never do so. More realistic is a setting,
where trust evolves dependent on past behavior. A party should permanently
use incoming information to update its belief concerning the trustworthiness
of other parties.
In this paper, I therefore elaborate a di¤erent trust modeling approach,
which was touched by Hart & Holmström (1987) and which is in spirit similar
to Kreps et al. (1982). A two-period principal-agent relationship is consid-
ered, where a fraction of all principals in the economy is assumed to be
reliable. Reliable means that these principals always stick to their promises,
i.e. that they always honor implicit agreements.3 Unreliable principals, on
the other hand, simply act in a prot-maximizing way. Hence, they will
honor implicit agreements, only if it pays o¤ for them. Agents are assumed
to be unable to distinguish between principal types, this means, there is some
kind of adverse-selection problem.
The two modeling approaches di¤er in one important aspect: In the
innite-horizon approach, agents know that all principals are unreliable.
Contract negotiations therefore take place between agents and unreliable
principals. In the nite-horizon approach, even unreliable principals pretend
to be reliable; otherwise they could never enter any implicit agreement. As a
3This might be due to psychic costs they would incur, if exploiting an implicit agree-
ment. See, for similar argumentations, e.g. Frank (1987), Huang & Wu (1994), Huck
(1998), James Jr. (2002) or Sliwka (2003).
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result, each principal has to act as a reliable one so that contract negotiations
are in fact between agents and reliable principals. This di¤erence partly leads
to very di¤erent results. Most importantly, in the innite-horizon approach
an increase in the discount rate always leads to a worsening in implicit con-
tracting in the sense that the achievable surplus (weakly) decreases. The
reason is that a higher discount rate makes it less worthwhile to honor im-
plicit agreements so that these are less easily sustainable. In the nite-horizon
approach, on the other hand, implicit contracting might be improved, as the
discount rate increases. The intuition for this result is as follows: A pooling
equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium, where both types of principal honor the
implicit agreement in the rst period, entails benets and costs for the reli-
able principals. In the rst period, agents know that the implicit contract is
never reneged on. Thus, given a contract o¤er, they choose more favorable
actions than they would choose, if only reliable principals were expected to
honor the agreement. This benets the reliable principals. On the other
hand, in a pooling equilibrium reliable principals miss the chance to sepa-
rate from the unreliable ones so that pooling in the rst period is costly for
second-period contracting. An increase in the discount rate yields a decrease
in these costs, and, as a result, a pooling equilibrium may become more likely.
Furthermore, as, in such an equilibrium, more implicit agreements are hon-
ored in the rst period and, in the second period, more implicit agreements
are entered, the achievable surplus may increase in both periods.
To summarize, this paper demonstrates that the two trust modeling ap-
proaches may lead to very di¤erent predictions. A consequence is that con-
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clusions that have been derived from the innite-horizon approach have to be
handled with care. It should be conrmed whether or not these conclusions
hold under the alternative modeling approach.
A second contribution of this paper is that it explains the relation be-
tween the fraction of reliable principals in an economy and the structure of
implicit contracting, which should be useful in explaining di¤erences in con-
tractual agreements in di¤erent societies. Two countervailing e¤ects can, in
this context, be isolated. First, as the percentage of reliable principals gets
lower, it becomes more important for the reliable principals to pool with the
unreliable ones. Second, however, it also becomes more di¢ cult to induce
unreliable principals to honor the rst-period agreement, i.e. to actually
achieve a pooling equilibrium. Both e¤ects may be dominant so that a de-
crease in the percentage of reliable people may make a pooling equilibrium
more or less likely.
Besides its implications concerning the modeling of trust, this paper con-
tributes to the career concerns literature. As the present paper, work on
career concerns (see e.g. Dewatripont et al. (1999a, b), Holmström (1999)
or Fingleton & Raith (2005)) emphasizes the fact that people often choose
actions in order to inuence market perceptions about certain of their char-
acteristics.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents, as a benchmark
case, the innite-horizon trust-modeling approach. Section 3 introduces its
nite-horizon counterpart and contains the main results of the paper. Section
4 contains a concluding discussion.
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2 The innite-horizon approach
2.1 The stage game
Consider a relationship between a principal (she) and an agent (he), both
being risk-neutral and unlimitedly liable. The agent chooses e¤ort e at cost
C(e) = 0:5ce2, with c > 0, in order to produce output y = e that completely
accrues to the principal. The surplus to be realized is therefore given by
S = e  0:5ce2 so that the rst-best e¤ort, that is, the e¤ort maximizing S,
is efb = 1c (and the corresponding surplus Sfb =
1
2c
). E¤ort and, accordingly,
output are assumed to be observable by the principal, but unveriable to
third parties (e.g. a court).4 This assumption should be fullled in many
practical settings, where the contribution of agents to rm value is impos-
sible to assess. Further, we assume that there is no objective measure that
might allow inference of the agents e¤ort. Hence, the principal cannot use
explicit incentives to motivate the agent so that implicit contracts are the
only thinkable incentive device.
In the market, there are only a few principals, but many agents. As a
result, in negotiations, principals are supposed to have the complete bargain-
ing power. Thus, a principal only has to make sure that the agent receives
an expected payment equal to or higher than his reservation utility, which is
normalized to zero.
4Note that the results to be derived in this paper do not depend on the assumption
that output and e¤ort are the same. As long as e¤ort is observable by the principal, they
would continue to hold, if output was given by y = f (e; "), with " denoting some random
components.
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The solution to the stage game is very simple. The agent never exerts
positive e¤ort and the principal never pays anything to the agent. This
solution can be derived by backward induction. If the principal promised
the agent a reward for choosing positive e¤ort, she would ex post, i.e. after
realization of output, claim that e¤ort was zero and deny the reward. The
agent would anticipate the principals reaction and choose zero e¤ort. If,
conversely, the principal would pay the agent a wage before the latter chose
e¤ort, optimal e¤ort would be zero. Again, this is anticipated by the principal
who then chooses a zero wage.
In order to enable a more satisfying solution, we have to make implicit
agreements feasible. The most prominent approach is to consider the in-
nitely repeated version of the analyzed stage game. This is what we do
next.
2.2 The innitely repeated version of the stage game
To derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the innitely repeated version
of the stage game, some additional assumptions have to be made. First, we
assume that payo¤s are discounted at a rate r. That is, a payo¤ of 1 unit
in the next period is worth  := 1
1+r
2 (0; 1) units in the present one. The
discount rate may account for the interest rate, at which the parties can lend
or borrow money or simply for the partiesimpatience.
Due to Levin (2003), we can focus on stationary contracts, i.e. contracts,
where the playersactions do not change from period to period. Without
loss of generality, we then concentrate on per-period contracts of the form
7
(s; b; e^). In words, at the beginning of each period, the principal pays the
agent a xed wage s. Further, she promises to pay a bonus b, if e¤ort is
at least as high as e^. The agent then chooses his e¤ort, and, thereafter,
output is realized. Finally, the principal decides on whether or not to pay
the promised bonus.5
The parties are assumed to employ a Grim-trigger strategy. Roughly
speaking, they start by cooperating and continue cooperation, unless one
party defects. In this case, they refuse cooperation forever after. Although
these strategies have technical shortcomings (they are e.g. not renegotiation-
proof)6, they are - partly due to their simplicity - very prominent and mainly
used in the literature on implicit contracting.
We are now able to solve the model. To do so, consider an arbitrary
period and start by assuming that the agent trusts the principal, i.e. the
agent believes that an e¤ort choice of at least e^ is rewarded by a bonus
5Notice that the time structure cannot be changed such that the principal acts before
the agent. This follows from the assumption that the agent has no bargaining power and,
accordingly, no incentive to honor the implicit agreement.
6The problem that, under the Grim-Trigger strategies, there is scope for renegotiation
after a deviation of one party can be solved as follows (see e.g. the textbook by Bolton
& Dewatripont (2005), p. 467): Instead of playing the stage-game Nash equilibrium in
the punishment phase, the parties could play jointly e¢ cient punishments, but change the
division of the surplus after a deviation. In particular, the division should be changed
such that the deviating party receives exactly the same payo¤ as in the Nash-equilibrium
of the stage game. Note that the results to be derived remain the same, if we assume the
parties to follow this second type of strategy.
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payment. He then chooses e¤ort equal to
e =
8><>: e^, if b  0:5ce^
2
0, otherwise
(1)
It directly follows that the principal will never set the bonus lower than the
costs entailed by e¤ort, as, in this case, no e¤ort could be induced. Note
further that it is also weakly dominated to set b > 0:5ce^2. Compared to the
choice of b = 0:5ce^2, the reneging temptation of the principal increases, while
no further e¤ort is induced. Hence, we can restrict attention to the case,
where b = 0:5ce^2 so that the agents expected utility becomes EU = s. As,
in the optimum, the participation constraint of the agent is binding, the xed
wage equals zero yielding the following per-period prot for the principal:
 =
r
2b
c
  b (2)
The principal wants to choose b so as to maximize this prot. Thereby,
however, she has to consider a non-reneging constraint. This constraint en-
sures that, after observation of e¤ort, the principal does not refuse to pay the
bonus. Otherwise, the agent would anticipate this refusal, and the implicit
contract was completely worthless. The non-reneging constraint says that
the principals gain from not paying the bonus, namely b, must not exceed
the corresponding loss. The latter is given by the present value of the loss in
future prots: As the agent refuses to cooperate forever after, implicit con-
tracts would no longer be feasible so that future prots were all zero. Hence,
the non-reneging constraint can be written as
b  1
r
 r
2b
c
  b
!
(3)
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The principal maximizes (2) subject to constraint (3). The Lagrangian to
this maximization problem is L =
q
2b
c
  b+ 

br  
q
2b
c
+ b

. The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are given by (3) and
(1  )
 
0:5
r
2
bc
  1
!
+ r = 0 (4)
The optimal solution depends on whether or not (3) is binding. If it is
not ( = 0), b = 1
2c
so that the rst-best solution will be achieved. If, on
the other hand,  > 0, a second-best solution might be possible, where the
optimal bonus can be derived from the binding version of condition (3). It
is the maximal value for b solving br 
q
2b
c
+ b = 0, which is b = 2
c(1+r)2
. To
summarize, the optimal implicit bonus equals
b =
8><>:
1
2c
, if r  1
2
c(1+r)2
, if r > 1
9>=>; (5)
Note that, under the assumptions made, the surplus is equal to the principals
prot and given by
S =  =
8><>:
1
2c
, if r  1
2r
c(1+r)2
, if r > 1
9>=>; (6)
From (6), it is straightforward to derive the subsequent proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal surplus S is (weakly) decreasing in r.
Proof. If r  1, S is independent of r. For r = 1, the two expressions for the
surplus are the same, namely 1
2c
. To see what happens, if, then, r increases,
di¤erentiate 2r
c(1+r)2
with respect to r. This yields 2(1 r)
c(1+r)3
, which is negative
for r > 1.
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Proposition 1 has a very simple intuition.7 If r increases, the value of
future transactions with the agent decreases for the principal. An increase
in r yields a decrease in the value of future prots, as these are discounted
more heavily. As a consequence, it becomes less worthwhile for the principal
to honor the implicit agreement since the punishment for reneging on the
implicit bonus decreases. The implicit bonus to be sustainable thus (weakly)
decreases implying that the agents e¤ort decreases as well. As the e¤ort is
never chosen ine¢ ciently high, this implies that the expected surplus gets
lower, too.
Although this result seems very intuitive, we will show in the following
section that it depends on the used modeling approach. The nite-horizon
approach we consider next, might lead to quite di¤erent ndings.
3 The nite-horizon approach
We now consider a setting, where the stage-game from Section 2.1 is repeated
once, i.e. we have two periods t = 1; 2. Additionally, we assume that a frac-
tion  of all principals in the economy is reliable. Reliable means that these
principals always stick to their promises, hence they never break any implicit
agreement. As mentioned before, this might be due to psychic costs they
would incur, if doing so. The remaining principals as well as all agents in the
economy are supposed to not incur such costs. Note that an implicit agree-
ment again requires the agents to act before the principals, as, otherwise, the
7Notice that the argumentation in this paragraph is very similar to the idea, which is
behind the folk theorem.
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agents would refuse to stick to their promise. A contract again consists of
a triple (st; bt; e^t), with st denoting a xed payment from principal to agent
and bt an implicit bonus to be paid, if the agent has chosen e¤ort of at least
e^t.
Deriving the model solution, we work backwards and start with period
2. As the game ends after period 2, unreliable principals will always refuse
to pay the bonus b2, while reliable ones stick to their promise, and so pay
the agent the agreed upon bonus. At the beginning of the second period,
the agent may still not know his principals type. Therefore, let Q2 denote
the agents probability assessment that he works together with a reliable
principal. In other words, the agent believes that, with probability Q2, a
choice of e¤ort weakly exceeding e^2 is followed by the bonus payment b2.
Being o¤ered a contract (s2; b2; e^2), the agent hence chooses e¤ort equal to
e2 =
8><>: e^2, if Q2b2  0:5c (e^2)
2
0, otherwise
(7)
It directly follows that any bonus below 0:5c(e^2)
2
Q2
cannot be optimal for the
principal, as no incentives would be induced by such a bonus. Bearing this
in mind, the agents expected utility is given by EU2 = s2+Q2b2 0:5c (e^2)2.
Again, principals are assumed to have complete bargaining power and make
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er so that s2 =  Q2b2 + 0:5c (e^2)2. Note that, at the
beginning of the second period, each principal has an interest to claim to be
of the reliable type. Otherwise, she could not enter any implicit agreement.
This implies that, although the agent might not be sure that he works to-
gether with a reliable principal, contract negotiations are between an agent
12
and a principal who acts like a reliable one. Stated di¤erently, although
an unreliable principal would like to o¤er a di¤erent contract than a reliable
one, she cannot, as this would reveal her type. Formally, the optimal contract
therefore solves
Max
b2;e^2
2r = e^2   0:5c (e^2)2   (1 Q2) b2 (8)
s:t: Q2b2  0:5c (e^2)2
, where 2r denotes the second-period prot of a reliable principal. One can
easily see that, for Q2 < 1, the incentive compatibility constraint Q2b2 
0:5c (e^2)
2 is always binding in the optimum. For Q2 = 1, it may or may
not be binding. In the latter case, the agent is sure that he works with
a reliable principal. Then, we always obtain the rst-best solution. The
principal promises to compensate the agent for the costs, entailed by e¤ort
and she can either do this by choosing the minimum bonus b2 = 0:5c (e^2)
2
together with the maximum xed wage s2 = 0 or by increasing the bonus
and decreasing the xed wage by the same amount. When continuing with
our maximization problem, we can therefore assume that Q2b2 = 0:5c (e^2)
2,
as, for any Q2 2 [0; 1], there exists an optimum, where this condition holds.
The principals maximization-problem then simplies to
Max
e^2
2r = e^2   0:5c (e^2)
2
Q2
(9)
which leads to the solution
e^2 =
Q2
c
; b2 =
Q2
2c
(10)
Note that, for Q2 < 1, b2 < 12c and e^2 <
1
c
so that both, the bonus and
the agents e¤ort, are ine¢ ciently low. The reason is the following: If the
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agent is in doubt about the type of the principal he works with, he will not
choose e¤ort as high as he would in case he knew for sure that the principal
was reliable. Implicit incentives o¤ered by a reliable principal are then not
as e¤ective as they were, could the principal reveal her type. Yet, a reliable
principal always sticks to her promise and hence bears the full bonus costs.
This situation has the same structure as a free-rider problem and leads to
ine¢ ciently low bonus choices. Clearly, b2 is increasing in Q2. The more the
agent thinks he is dealing with a reliable principal, the higher will be the
bonus and, accordingly, the agents e¤ort, as trustworthy principals get more
for what they pay for.
Let us conclude the second period by calculating the principalssecond-
period prots.8 These are as follows:9
2r =
Q2
2c
(11)
2u =
Q2
c
(12)
Note that both, 2r as well as 2u, are increasing in Q2. As mentioned before,
reliable principals are better o¤ being identied as reliable since they can set
incentives more e¢ ciently. On the other hand, unreliable principals gain by
fooling the agents and pretending to be reliable, for they can then install
implicit incentives, which they are not going to pay for. In the rst period,
there may thus be some kind of conict between both types of principals.
Unreliable principals may want to signal to be reliable, while reliable princi-
8The second-period surplus may di¤er from second-period prot. We derive this surplus
explicitly after having analyzed the rst period.
92u denotes the second-period prot of an unreliable principal.
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pals may want to prevent this. To explore the implications of this interest
conict more clearly, we next turn to period 1.
In the rst period, after e¤ort observation, reliable principals stick to
their promise and pay the bonus b1 as determined in the implicit contract.
Unreliable principals, however, will only stick to their promise, if the involved
gain in reputation outweighs the bonus costs. We assume, in this context,
that principals who pay their agent a bonus lower than the one agreed upon,
are stigmatized as being unreliable.10 Unreliable principals therefore decide
between paying the bonus b1 or refusing to pay anything at all. In the rst
case, the agents do not learn anything new about the principals so that
Q2 = . This case is denoted as a pooling equilibrium. In the latter case,
we have a separating equilibrium (as the agents perfectly learn the principal
types), where Q2 = 1 for reliable principals and Q2 = 0 for unreliable ones.
Unreliable principals will thus fulll the implicit agreement, if and only if the
following condition holds:11
b1  1
1 + r

c
=: X (13)
The agents optimal e¤ort choice is obtained from (7) by replacing the sub-
script 2 by the subscript 1. Here, Q1 does not denote the probability that the
agent faces a reliable principal, but the probability that he faces a principal
10Recall our assumption that reliable principals always stick to their promise. It is
therefore natural to stigmatize principals as unreliable, if they deviate from the promised
bonus. Moreover, note that the results are not sensitive to the assumption that principals
paying more than the promised bonus are not stigmatized as being unreliable.
11We implicitly assume that an unreliable principal will honor the rst-period agreement,
if he is indi¤erent between doing and not doing so.
15
that will honor the rst-period implicit agreement. As indicated in the pre-
ceding discussion, even unreliable principals may nd it worthwhile to honor
implicit agreements in the rst period.
In contract negotiations, the same argumentation as in the second period
applies. Again, all principals pretend to be reliable so that bargaining is
factually between agents and reliable principals. Note that therefore reliable
principals decide on whether or not to pool with their unreliable counter-
parts. Before presenting the solution explicitly, it is therefore convenient to
say something about the benets and costs of a pooling equilibrium for the
reliable principals. A pooling equilibrium (compared to a separating equilib-
rium) improves contracting in the rst period, but worsens the situation for
reliable principals in the second. The reason is very simple. In a pooling equi-
librium, agents know that all rst-period agreements are honored, whereas,
in a separating equilibrium, the fraction 1    of all implicit agreements is
reneged on. In the second period, we have a reverse argumentation. In a sep-
arating equilibrium, agents know the type of the principal they are dealing
with. Reliable principals are thus able to implement the rst-best solution.
In a pooling equilibrium, on the other hand, reliable principals are worse
o¤ since agents know that only with probability  the implicit agreement is
honored.
Summarizing, a pooling equilibrium is, for reliable principals, accompa-
nied by probability assessments (Q1 = 1; Q2 = ), while the corresponding
probabilities in a separating equilibrium are (Q1 = ;Q2 = 1). It is further
important to note that rst-period contracting might be deteriorated, as con-
16
dition (13) has to be taken into account. If reliable principals want to achieve
a pooling equilibrium, they will have to make sure that it is in the interest
of unreliable principals to honor the implicit agreement. This may a¤ect the
optimal contract choice.
Let us now solve the model explicitly. Consider rst the case of a pooling
equilibrium. Here, the maximization problem is given by12
Max
b1;e^1
1r;P = e^1   0:5c (e^1)2 (14)
s:t: b1  0:5c (e^1)2 ;
b1  X
It is not restrictive at all to replace the condition b1  0:5c (e^1)2 by its binding
version b1 = 0:5c (e^1)
2. A bonus b1 higher than 0:5c (e^1)
2 would make the
fulllment of the pooling constraint (13) less likely and is therefore (weakly)
dominated. It follows that the solution to the maximization problem only
depends on whether or not (13) is binding. The achievable prot in either
case is
1r;P =
8><>:
1
2c
, if 1
2c
 X
p
2
c
p
1+r
  
c(1+r)
, otherwise
(15)
In words, in a pooling equilibrium, the rst-best solution is feasible, if, under
the rst-best bonus b1 = 12c , the pooling constraint is fullled. Otherwise,
the bonus is given by b1 = 11+r

c
leading to prot 1r;p =
p
2
c
p
1+r
  
c(1+r)
.
The analysis in the case of a separating equilibrium is similar. Here, the
12The second entry in the subscript accompanying  indicates, whether the case of a
pooling (P ) or separating (S) equilibrium is considered.
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maximization problem is given by
Max
b1;e^1
1r;S = e^1   0:5c (e^1)2   (1  ) b1 (16)
s:t: b1  0:5c (e^1)2 ;
b1 > X
In a separating equilibrium, the condition b1  0:5c (e^1)2 need not be
binding. If the separating condition requires a bonus that, together with
b1 = 0:5c (e^1)
2, would lead to ine¢ ciently high e¤ort, then it would be bet-
ter to make the condition b1  0:5c (e^1)2 slack.13 Therefore, the achievable
prot depending on the parameter values is14
1r;S =
8>>>><>>>>:

2c
, if 
2c
> X
p
2
c
p
1+r
  
c(1+r)
, if 
2c
 X  1
2c
1
2c
  (1 )
(1+r)c
, otherwise
(17)
It remains to be shown, under what circumstances the reliable princi-
pals select a pooling equilibrium and when they prefer to play a separating
equilibrium. The following proposition gives an answer to this question:
Proposition 2 There will be a pooling equilibrium, if either (i)
p
2 (1 + r) 
0:5   (1 + 0:5r) > 0 and r > 1, (ii) p2 (1 + r)p     0:5 (1  ) > 0
and 2   1 < r  1 or (iii) r  2   1.
13Note that, in the opposite case of a pooling equilibrium, e¤ort is never chosen ine¢ -
ciently high, as the pooling constraint imposes a downward pressure on the bonus to be
installed.
14In case 2c  X, the reliable principals have to determine the bonus slightly above X
in order to separate from the reliable ones. To simplify calculations, however, we assume
b1 = X, when determining the prot. All results to be derived should qualitatively be the
same, if this bonus would be replaced by b1 = X + , with  > 0 and ! 0.
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Proof. Depending on the parameter constellations, there may arise four
di¤erent cases: In case (i), X < 
2c
, in the second case, 
2c
 X < 1
2c
, in case
(iii) 1
2c
 X  1
2c
and in case (iv), X > 1
2c
. In the rst case, the present
value of the two pooling prots for a reliable principal is given by15
PVP;i =
p
2
c
p
1 + r
  
c (1 + r)
+
1
1 + r

2c
, while the corresponding value in the case of separation is given by
PVS;i =

2c
+
1
1 + r
1
2c
Pooling will be optimal, if the former value exceeds the latter resulting inp
2 (1 + r)  0:5   (1 + 0:5r) > 0. Note further that the condition X < 
2c
is equivalent to r > 1. In the second case, the pooling prots are the same
as before, whereas the present value of the separating prots changes to
PVS;ii =
p
2
c
p
1 + r
  
c (1 + r)
+
1
1 + r
1
2c
Pooling will then be preferred, if
p
2
c
p
1+r
  
c(1+r)
+ 1
1+r

2c
>
p
2
c
p
1+r
  
c(1+r)
+ 1
1+r
1
2c
,
which is equivalent to
p
2
p
   
p
1 + r   0:5 (1  ) > 0. Furthermore,
the restrictions on X in the second case are equivalent to 2   1 < r  1.
Further, in the third case, the present value of the prots under separation
is the same as in the second case. The present value of the pooling prots,
on the other hand, changes to
PVP;iii =
1
2c
+
1
1 + r

2c
15The rst entry in the subscript distinguishes between whether a pooling (P ) or a
separating (S) equilibrium is played. The second entry describes the respective case,
which is considered.
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The condition guaranteeing that pooling is preferred can be shown to be
equivalent to 0:5r + 1:5  p2 (1 + r) > 0. Moreover, 1
2c
 X  1
2c
,
22 1  r  2 1. It is easy to show that, for 22 1  r  2 1, the rst
condition 0:5r + 1:5  p2 (1 + r) > 0 is always fullled. To demonstrate
this, dene F (r; ) := 0:5r + 1:5  p2 (1 + r). Then, @F
@r
= 0:5   p
2(1+r)
so that F has a minimum at ~r, with 0:5   p
2(1+~r)
= 0 , ~r = 22   1. It
follows that F (~r; ) = 1:5 2 0:5. The condition r  2 1 implies that 
cannot be (weakly) lower than 0:5, i.e.  > 0:5. It remains to be shown that,
F (~r; ) > 0, for  > 0:5. @F (~r;)
@
= 1:5   2, which is positive, i¤  < 0:75.
As F (~r; 0:5) = 0 and F (~r; 1) = 0, F (~r; ) has to be strictly positive for all
 2 (0:5; 1).
In the fourth case, the pooling prots are the same as in case (iii). In
contrast, the present value of the separating prots changes to
PVS;iv =
1
2c
  (1  ) 
(1 + r) c
+
1
1 + r
1
2c
Pooling is therefore preferred, i¤ 1
2c
+ 1
1+r

2c
> 1
2c
  (1 )
(1+r)c
+ 1
1+r
1
2c
, 1:5  
0:5 2 > 0. Notice that X > 1
2c
, 22 1 > r. This implies that  > p0:5.
As seen before, 1:5   0:5   2 is then strictly positive. This completes the
proof of Proposition 2.
It is convenient to illustrate the parameter constellations, for which a
pooling equilibrium is chosen, in a gure. To simplify the exposition, we
replace the discount rate r by the discount factor , making use of the re-
lation r = 1 

. The following gure depicts the choice of equilibrium (the
shaded area depicts the set of parameters (; ), which leads to a pooling
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equilibrium):
Figure 1: Type of equilibrium depending on parameter constellations
From Figure 1, we see that an increase in r (or a decrease in ) may
make a pooling equilibrium more or less likely. To explain this, notice that
an increase in r has two e¤ects on the likelihood of a pooling equilibrium.
The rst e¤ect is very similar to the argumentation from Section 2. If r in-
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creases, it is more di¢ cult to convince the unreliable principals to honor the
implicit agreement. The gain of these principals from honoring the agree-
ment is a higher prot in the second period. If r gets higher, this prot is
discounted more heavily and a deviation from the agreement is more prof-
itable. Therefore, the implicit bonus to be sustained in a pooling equilibrium
must decrease, which makes the separating equilibrium (relatively) more at-
tractive.
There is, however, a second e¤ect that was absent in the model from
Section 2 and that works into the opposite direction. As mentioned before,
reliable principals decide on whether or not to play a pooling equilibrium.
Their benet from such an equilibrium is a better contract in the rst period,
while they su¤er from a worse contract in the second. Hence, if r increases,
the costs of a pooling equilibrium are discounted more heavily so that it
becomes more protable. As illustrated in Figure 1, this e¤ect may well
be dominant. A pooling equilibrium may therefore become more likely, the
higher the discount rate.
To conclude the analysis, I am now going to present explicit formulas for
the rst-period prots and for the surplus in both, period 1 and period 2.
Before doing so dene the set of parameter constellations (r; ), for which a
pooling (separating) equilibrium is chosen, by A (B). The two prots are
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then given by16
1r =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1
2c
, if (r; ) 2 A and r  2   1
p
2
c
p
1+r
  
c(1+r)
, if (r; ) 2 A and r > 2   1

2c
, if (r; ) 2 B and r > 1
p
2
c
p
1+r
  
c(1+r)
, if (r; ) 2 B and r  1
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
(18)
1u =
8>>>><>>>>:
1r, if (r; ) 2 A

c
, if (r; ) 2 B and r > 1
p
2
c
p
1+r
, if (r; ) 2 B and r  1
9>>>>=>>>>; (19)
The surplus to be achieved in the rst period is simply given by e¤ort minus
costs entailed by e¤ort.17 In the second period, however, one has to take into
account that, in a separating equilibrium, only the fraction  of all principal-
agent relationships is continued. Second-period surplus therefore equals e2 
0:5c (e2)
2 in a pooling and 
 
e2   0:5c (e2)2

in a separating equilibrium. The
following expressions describe the two surpluses S1 and S2 depending on the
parameter constellations:
S1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
1r = 1u, if (r; ) 2 A

2c
(2  ) , if (r; ) 2 B and r > 1
p
2
c
p
1+r
  2
c(1+r)
, if (r; ) 2 B and r  1
9>>>>=>>>>; (20)
16Recall that, for r  2  1, there will never arise a separating equilibrium. Therefore,
when deriving the prots in a separating equilibrium, we only have to consider the two
cases, where the constraint b1  0:5c (e^1)2 is binding.
17One argument for principals to be reliable was that these principals would feel psychic
costs, if exploiting trust. As these psychic costs are never incurred, they do not have to
be considered in the surplus formula.
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S2 =
8><>:

2c
(2  ) , if (r; ) 2 A

2c
, if (r; ) 2 B
9>=>; (21)
From (20) and (21), one can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3 S1, S2 as well as both, S1 and S2, may be increasing in r.
Proof. Consider an increase in r and suppose that this increase induces the
reliable principals to switch from a separating equilibrium to a pooling one.
From (21), it can directly be seen that S2 then increases. To demonstrate
that S1 may also be increasing in r we consider a concrete example, where
 = 0:2. Further, we assume that r increases from r1 = 0 to r2 = 0:4. We
are therefore in the second case described in Proposition 2. At the initial
discount rate, a separating equilibrium is selected resulting in surplus S1s =
0:2
p
2
c
  0:04
c
= 0:243
c
. For r2 = 0:4, the reliable principals switch to a pooling
equilibrium with the corresponding surplus S1p =
p
0:4
c
p
1:4
  0:2
1:4c
= 0:392
c
, which
is clearly higher than S1s.
This proposition shows that the main result from Section 2 does not
carry over to the alternative trust modeling approach. In particular, optimal
surplus may be increasing in the discount rate. That is, discounting is not
necessarily bad from the viewpoint of implicit contracting. The reason is that
an increase in the discount rate may induce the reliable principals to switch
from a separating to a pooling equilibrium. Such a pooling equilibrium is
benecial for two reasons: First, agents know that all rst-period contracts
are honored, which may improve the situation in the rst period. Second,
more agreements are entered in the second period. While in a separating
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equilibrium only the relationships between agents and reliable principals are
continued, in a pooling equilibrium, unreliable principals enter second-period
agreements as well. Although this is detrimental for second-period contract-
ing of the reliable principals, the e¤ect that more contracts are entered is
dominant so that, in period 2, a pooling equilibrium leads to higher welfare
than a separating one.
Furthermore, the fact that di¤erent trust modeling approaches lead to
di¤erent results is also important, as most models make use of the innite-
horizon approach. As seen in this paper, implications derived from these
models have to be handled with care. It is therefore useful to analyze, whether
these implications are robust to an alternative modeling of trust.
Until now, we have analyzed the impact of the discount rate r on the
implicit contracts chosen by the parties. To complete the analysis, one should
take a look at the parameter  and its inuence on the contract choice. The
e¤ect of  is twofold: First, we have already mentioned that, for reliable
principals, a pooling (separating) equilibrium is accompanied by probability
assessments (Q1 = 1; Q2 = ) ((Q1 = ;Q2 = 1)). Hence, the benet and cost
a pooling equilibrium entails are decreasing in . To be more concrete, this
e¤ect says that a pooling equilibrium is preferable, if  is low and r very
high. In this case, a pooling equilibrium yields a high benet (a much better
contract in the rst period), while the corresponding cost (the lower prot
in period 2) is heavily discounted. A second e¤ect of  is that it a¤ects the
pooling condition (13). The right-hand-side of (13) is strictly increasing in .
This is intuitive. The higher , the more convinced are the agents that the
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implicit contract will be honored and the more do unreliable principals, in
the second period, gain from cheating on the agents. Therefore, the higher
(lower) , the more di¢ cult it is for the reliable principals to separate from
(pool with) the unreliable ones. Put di¤erently, the lower , the less likely it
is that, in the rst period, the optimal pooling contract can be installed.
For r ! 0, the rst e¤ect is (almost) absent and pooling becomes optimal,
if  is su¢ ciently large. This can be seen from Figure 1.18 If r increases, the
rst e¤ect becomes relevant, too. As is clear from the preceding discussion,
the two e¤ects are then countervailing. While a lower  in principle makes a
pooling equilibrium more benecial, it may prevent an e¢ cient bonus choice
so that a separating equilibrium may become preferable. Altogether, from
Figure 1 we see that a pooling equilibrium is likely to be chosen unless both,
 and r, are relatively low or both are relatively high.
4 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we opposed two di¤erent approaches to model implicit contract-
ing, an innite-horizon approach that is frequently used in economic models
and a nite-horizon approach based on an adverse-selection model. It was
found that even the most convincing result of the innite-horizon approach,
namely that implicit contracting is improved in case of a lower discount rate,
does not necessarily hold under the alternative approach. Therefore, predic-
tions derived from the rst modeling approach should be handled with care
18Notice that r ! 0,  ! 1.
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and subject to a reevaluation with the second approach.
A nice extension of the nite-horizon approach would be to apply it to the
theory of the rm.19 Agentsincentives would then stem from two sources:
Asset ownership and implicit agreements. As reliable principals that have
separated from unreliable ones, can perfectly motivate the agents by means
of implicit contracting, asset ownership is likely to be assigned to these prin-
cipals. Therefore, there could exist an equilibrium with the following intu-
itively appealing structure: In the rst period, agents do not know the prin-
cipal types and are thus protected by asset ownership. After the rst period,
principal types are revealed (i.e. the equilibrium is separating). Then, the
assets of those agents who work with reliable principals are removed to the
principals, while the remaining agents keep their assets. This would nicely
explain changes in ownership structures over time. If this equilibrium may
indeed exist, however, has to be shown analytically. I leave this for future
research.
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